



ed
To
or
he
ld
to
he
ow
gh
nt
in
he
pt
his
sh
in
ht
in

AN ENQUIRY

PREFACE

INTO THE

Merits of Confederation,

AND

THE DUTY OF THE HOUR.

BY ONE OF THE PEOPLE

PUBLISHED BY

Z. S. HALL, BOOKSELLER AND STATIONER,

165 AND 167 HOLLIS STREET, HALIFAX, N. S.

1867.

PREFACE.

IN the following pages the question of Confederation is discussed on its merits, in a spirit divested of all partizanship, and free from those feelings of personal antagonism and strong party bias that have so deeply tinged much that has appeared in the newspaper press, on both sides of the question. To the writer of this pamphlet it is less important that this or that political faction should be triumphant, than that the truth should be told, and that the mass of the people should have in their hands the data by which they may be able to judge fairly of the merits of this great question, and so be able to give an intelligent vote at the General Election now near approaching. For it must be remembered, that although the Act of Confederation has passed the British Parliament, it is still a duty incumbent upon the people of Nova Scotia to give their decision upon it. This duty they owe to the government and Parliament of England, who have been kept in ignorance of their interests and wishes with respect to this subject—to the government of Canada and New Brunswick, that have been parties to the unfair treatment Nova Scotia has received—and to themselves, in vindication of their right to exercise those constitutional privileges which have been in this most important crisis withheld from them.

AN ENQUIRY, &C.

INTRODUCTORY.

WHEN we find proverbs, catchwords and party cries, substituted for reason and argument, the tendency is to excite distrust of the cause in behalf of which they are used; or at the least, thinking men are prompted to enquire into their merits and meaning, if they have any, and to ascertain how far they may be fairly made to do duty in the service into which they are pressed. The old aphorism that "union is strength," a trite saying, true in itself, yet far from being of universal application, has for two years been used as the most convincing argument, in one of the greatest questions that has agitated British interests in America for the last eighty years. In point of fact "Union" is not always strength. A union between persons of incompatible temper, can never be prosperous or happy—a partnership between men of diverse business views, is not likely to be lasting or profitable; and a political connection between States of antagonistic interests, whose people are not homogeneous, whose statesmen are animated by different political instincts, and whose geographical position prompts to a different commercial policy, can never be productive of lasting advantage to the people so united. Such a union may perhaps be "strong" in the sense that it may endure for a time; but this can only be by the domination of one party and the humiliation of the other—by the complete absorption on the part of the stronger, of all the power which should have been shared equally with the weaker party to the contract. And it has always been found, in the world's history, that the enforced union of two or more States of nearly equal power, and of antagonistic interests, has been of short duration, with too often a disastrous ending.

Nothing is more common with a certain set of theorists, than to mistake the principal of co-operation, for union. No man lives for himself alone, but every man influences and is influenced by all others with whom he comes in contact. If we wish to carry out any important project, or to overcome any difficulty that obstructs our path, we naturally lock around

us for means to augment our power, and we strengthen our position by every co-operative aid within our reach. In the pursuit of wealth, for instance, the more extensive the trade operations within the natural laws that form the groundwork of all commercial transactions, the greater are the profits derived. And where the wealth or administrative ability of an individual is insufficient for the accomplishment of a great enterprise, the principal of co-operation is tried, and partnerships and joint stock companies, by a combination of effort, perform what would be impossible to any of the partners in the association, working separately. But this principle of co-operation extends only to the immediate purpose for which the association is formed, leaving the parties to it in every respect free and independent; and it is as far as possible removed from that idea of a union, that involves the surrender of all independence in its several members, and subordinates the will and the interests of the individual in everything to that of the body corporate. The same principle holds good as regards communities and Nations. What one State is unable to accomplish by herself, she may accomplish with the union or co-operation of her neighbors and allies. A few years ago, England sought to extend her commercial intercourse with France, and with aid of the latter, the commercial barriers existing between the two countries were to a large extent removed, to the mutual benefit of both. A few years ago France and England combined to check the power of Russia in the East, and succeeded. Such historical facts as these, proving the value of united national effort, not only illustrate the truth that "union is strength," but they also serve to show the only kind of union that nations of diverse interest and temperament ever can safely adopt. To effect these grand objects, it was only necessary that these two nations should unite in a common effort for those especial purposes, and not that either or both should surrender their perfect autonomy, and fuse their governmental institutions into a single set of legislative and administrative machinery holding sway at London or Paris. This latter, is the kind of union that has unfortunately been thrust upon the British American Provinces; but it is such a union as the statesmen of France and England would never dream of effecting between those two countries, and would be certain to lead to the downfall and destruction of both, if attempted. In this sense Venice was united to Austria, and Poland to the more powerful nations around her; but no body ever heard that the happiness and prosperity of the Poles and Venetians were

much enhanced by the change. Belgium, too, played the part of a subordinate in a series of unions, extending over a period of three hundred years with Austria, and with Spain, and finally with her nearer neighbor, Holland; and it is only within the last thirty five years, when she has been free from encumbering and enslaving political unions which are not strength—when she has been a free, self-governing State, regulating her own commerce, disbursing her own revenues and concentrating the energies of her people in developing her manufacturing capabilities and mineral resources, that her people have begun to make any real progress in material prosperity.

In proceeding to discuss this question of union as applicable to Nova Scotia in connection with the other British American Provinces, it is not necessary to revert to the motives or consistency of individuals who have taken a leading part on either side of the controversy. Personal allusions, and arguments based upon the opinions or policy of politicians, must have a tendency rather to distract the attention from the main features of the subject, than to aid in their elucidation. A careful consideration of the position of Nova Scotia, of her resources, and what is necessary for their development, is all that is required to show whether she is likely to be most benefitted or injured by being “confederated” with Canada, and whether the majority in the Provincial Parliament acted wisely, or the reverse, in forcing by violence and in defiance of popular rights, so great a change upon the people of this Province.

THE POSITION AND PROSPECTS OF NOVA SCOTIA.

Few countries in the world are more favorably situated whether as regards political freedom, geographical position or the extent and variety of their natural resources, than Nova Scotia. Forming that portion of the American continent nearest to Europe, and being almost an island and possessing numerous magnificent harbors, she is in a position to participate largely in the trade and commerce of both hemispheres. A bracing climate gives vigor and health to an enterprising population. Throughout a great part of the country, a generous soil yields a fruitful return to the labors of the husbandman. Extensive forests afford material for building ships, and supplying them afterwards with cargoes of a valuable export. Mines of Coal, Iron and Gold, give em-

ployment to thousands of operatives. Her streams and the waters around her shores teem with almost exhaustless quantities of fish, which form a profitable article of exchange with other countries. Being a British Province, she has all the advantages that such a connection with the most powerful empire in the world can give her—the blessing of British laws, access to the trade of every country that has commercial intercourse with Great Britain, and the protection of the British flag for her merchant ships in every sea on the face of the globe. These advantages have been so far improved of late years as to place the inhabitants of Nova Scotia among the most prosperous people on the earth. In the ten years between 1851 and 1861, the population increased in number twenty per cent, and in the last six years it is believed that the ratio of increase has been still greater. Living at peace with all countries, Nova Scotia has been quietly but industriously and vigorously following her own pursuits, cultivating the soil, causing the wilderness to give place to waving fields of grain, catching fish which have been sold at a profit to our neighbors, building ships which go abroad for sale, or go to earn rich freights in the carrying trade of the world, building railroads, opening mines of Coal or gold, and in all these avocations realizing a rapidly increasing wealth. Manufactures, too, have begun to start into existence, as capital accumulated, and many useful articles are now being produced within the Province, which formerly were obtained entirely from abroad. So prosperous has the country been, that the increase of wealth has been much greater than the increase of population, as is clearly shown from the returns of trade and revenue. Under a tariff so light that its operation has not been felt by the people, the revenue of the Province from all sources, has grown from \$691,015 in 1856, to \$1,708,655 in 1866, an increase of 250 per cent, under the perfect system of self government which the Province has possessed for the last twenty years, and the great value of which the people were but beginning to realize and appreciate when it is rudely snatched from them. These revenues have been in the main wisely applied in developing the resources of the country, and in such a way as to still further augment this progressive prosperity. Railways have been opened up, east and west, to grasp the trade of the St. Lawrence and of the Bay of Fundy. Light Houses have been built, Rivers bridged, new lines of roads penetrate the country in every direction, Post Offices have been established in every village and settlement, Education has been liberally provided for, large

grants have been given to Steamboats and Packets connecting with the neighboring Provinces, and all this under a taxation the lightest in existence in any country possessed of representative institutions.

Such is the Province, and such its present position—a position that, if unchanged, gives the certain promise of still greater prosperity in the future; and yet it is when Nova Scotia is in this prosperous position, the object at once of the envy and admiration of her neighbors, that the system of self government which has produced all this prosperity, and prepared the way for still more rapid strides in material advancement, is to be thrown aside, and the doubtful experiment thrust upon her of a political union with other Provinces in which her power of self government will be destroyed, and she must submit to the rule of a larger and it is to be feared not too kindly population. What is there in this condition of things to demand such a change in the political condition of Nova Scotia, or what advantage is this Province to receive in exchange for the surrender of her political freedom, involved in the policy of Confederation? The advocates of that measure will reply,—we shall have a larger country, we shall have free trade with three and a half millions of people, a uniform postal system and currency, consolidation of the strength of the Provinces for purposes of defence, the Inter-colonial Railway, with other benefits of a somewhat undefinable and mythical character. If extent of territory were indispensable to national greatness, there might be some force in some of these suggestions. But the history of the world gives so many proofs to the contrary of this, that it would be idle to reason at any length upon it. Greece and Rome afford notable examples of the greatness to which States possessed of but small territory may attain, and also of the danger and weakness that may lie in attempting to govern widely extended regions of country. Our father land is a sufficient illustration, if there were no other in existence, that extent of territory is not necessary to national greatness—that wealth, and power, and the most potent influence in the family of nations, does not depend upon the number of acres a country possesses, but on the enterprise, fortitude and patriotism of her people. Let an unprejudiced, clear sighted political economist, carefully consider those proposed gains,—let him consider the hopelessness of any attempt to “consolidate” the population of Nova Scotia for military or any other purposes, with the population of a Province a thousand miles away, when the most direct line of communi-

cation between them is intersected by a far more numerous population, belonging to a foreign country, and then say if these hoped for advantages are likely to form an equivalent for the revenues and the blessings of self government that Nova Scotia is compelled to surrender in exchange for them.

But it must be remembered, that however great the advantages of free trade and all the other promised blessings may be, they are such as might all be obtained by that kind of co-operative effort already referred to, and without the sacrifice of her political institutions Nova Scotia must make under Confederation. There has been free trade between the Provinces for twelve years, in all the natural productions of the field, the forest, the mine, and the sea. The same generous spirit of liberal legislation that produced this concession from the old exclusive system of trade, if allowed to have sway, could easily extend the free list to cover certain manufactures as well as natural productions, if such extension were deemed advisable, and without any one Province being called on to sacrifice her right of self government in exchange for it. Under these circumstances, then, may it not with truth be said that confederation is at best a doubtful and hazardous experiment for Nova Scotia.

Precedents and illustrations of the advantages of union have been eagerly sought after in the pages of history, by those who have desired to unite this Province to Canada. Cases closely parallel are not easy to find, and the nearer they approach the conditions of the British North American Provinces, the less ground do they give Nova Scotians to hope for prosperity under the union. Perhaps

THE CASE OF BELGIUM

Furnishes the best illustration of the evils of such a political condition as that on which Nova Scotia is now entering, that can be found. The cases are nearly parallel, although reversed as to the order of the changes that took place in their constitution. Nova Scotia leaves behind her a career of almost unexampled prosperity enjoyed under her own free government, to try her chance as a fractional part of a great confederacy, whose principal member's history gives but little reason to hope for any great degree of happiness or business success in the partnership. Belgium, on the contrary, emerged thirty years ago from the bonds of a confederacy, to enter upon a career of activity and enterprise, to which she had

not been able to attain in the three hundred years that she formed a part of one or another great European nation. The two countries are nearly equal in extent; Belgium being somewhat the larger and the more populous of the two.

Like Nova Scotia, Belgium possesses fair agricultural capabilities, vast mineral wealth in iron and coal, with valuable forests in the mountainous parts. From the fifteenth century, she formed successively part of the dominions of Austria and Spain, who controlled her laws, levied her taxes and expended her revenues, down to 1795, when she fell under the power of France. In 1815 she was annexed to Holland, and continued to be confederated with that country down to 1830. In that year she gained her independence after a brief and almost bloodless revolution, and established a constitutional monarchy, under which she has ever since been most happily governed. We have here, therefore, in the case of this country, very little larger than Nova Scotia, and possessed of the same description of natural resources, an experience of over three hundred years, under a confederacy, as a fractional part of one or another "great nation," and thirty-six years of what some people sneer at as isolation, but what has been in truth the only thirty-six years in which she ever enjoyed the blessings of responsible self government, with the power of disbursing her own revenues for the development of her own commercial and internal resources. The result ought to startle those people in Nova Scotia who have been captivated by the solemn nonsense so industriously circulated about the advantage that must result to a small country from being united to a larger one. All Belgium's great natural wealth was of but little use to her, while she was without the power to control and direct its development. In 1830, when she freed herself from the shackles of a confederacy, whose blighting influence she had in one shape or another felt for over three centuries, she had scarcely a mile of railroad, her manufactures were of limited extent, her foreign commerce languished, and her agriculture was not prosecuted with vigor. As soon as her freedom was established she commenced a system of internal improvement by means of government disbursements, similar to that practised in Nova Scotia for the last fifteen years. Railroads were built at government expense, connecting her manufacturing and commercial cities, with the cities of the surrounding nations; manufactures were cherished, agriculture was fostered, and schools established. The result has been a degree of material progress such as perhaps no

European nation has experienced in the same time, her imports and exports having increased, from £10,770,000 in 1835, to £97,280,000 in 1864—thus increasing her products in thirty years under a free and independent government, to nearly ten times the figure they had reached during the three hundred years she was under Confederation. This immense trade, which still continues to expand, it may safely be said, could not have reached its present magnificent proportions for many years, under the political system by which the energies of that enterprising people were for centuries repressed.

Here, then, in that European Kingdom, and in this British American Colony, we have two illustrations of the advantages of self government in small countries possessed of peculiar resources, which the people of this Province should carefully ponder. Belgium emerges from three centuries of confederation which to her were three hundred years of poverty and of servitude, to open her coal mines, build her railroads, and expand her manufactures by a wise expenditure under her own free government, of those revenues which under the former system went into the treasury of the great nations of which she formed a part. Nova Scotia, after proving for fifteen or twenty years the great advantages of the same system of free government, is asked to abandon the policy that has proved so successful, and to adopt that system of confederation with a larger power, that the history not only of Belgium but of every small country that ever attempted it, has proved to be so ruinous to their best interests. If the experiment in her case proves anything else than disastrous, she will be more fortunate than she has any right to expect, and more fortunate than her people, if they now support the infatuated gamblers who have dragged her into such peril, will deserve.

THE TERMS OF UNION.

An important inquiry in this question is, are the terms of union just and equitable?—for unless they are, no man of spirit, no man of honor, should for a moment yield his assent thereto. We maintain that they are manifestly unjust, and invite your attention to an investigation thereof. First as to the representation in the Parliament. The aggregate population of the Provinces as given by the last census of 1861,—

Upper Canada,	1,396,091	82,	Representatives.
Lower Canada;	1,111,566	65,	"
Nova Scotia,	330,857	19,	"
New Brunswick,	252,047	15,	"
		3,090,561	181

This gives to Upper Canada one representative to every 17,025 of population:

to Lower Canada,	1 to 17,101
to Nova Scotia,	1 " 17,413
to New Brunswick,	1 " 16,803

Nova Scotia has therefore the smallest representation according to her population of any of the Provinces, 17,413 Nova Scotians being counted only equal to 17,025 Canadians. This however would not be a matter of so much complaint, provided the population of the Provinces was contiguous; that is, if they laid side by side and held daily intercourse, their local interests interweaving and acting upon each other so that when the representatives of one section sought aid from the government for any undertaking, they could count upon the assistance of neighboring representatives whose constituents would be locally benefited thereby, but it is scarcely possible to conceive territory more disjointed and broken up into separate interests than British America.

Nova Scotia lies almost separte, from New Brunswick by water. Then New Brunswick is again separated from Lower Canada, by a forest of 18,000 square miles; while a great part of Lower Canada, 21,000 square miles in extent, is worse than a howling wilderness, being inhabited by a people who have no sympathetic connection with us either in their habits, their pursuits, their nationality, or their language.

The very act of union provides, that both the French and English languages shall be used in the assembly, to make it a very Babel. This want of homogeneous connection between the several parts, makes the question of our representation depend entirely upon numbers, and when we look at these, we find we are out-numbered 8 to 1 by Canada, which virtually places us at her mercy. True there is a larger proportion allowed us in the Senate; but the Senate, as you are aware, will have no power over the revenues. As George Brown, one of the framers of the Quebec Scheme, boastingly observed, "Canada will hold the purse strings." Turning

to the debts with which each Province goes into the Confederacy, we see on the surface, the appearance of fair play, but on examination, the grossest injustice. Canada is to take into the partnership a debt of \$62½ millions, viz. \$24.92 cents per head of the population by last census. Nova Scotia is to be allowed \$8,000,000 being for the population of the same year \$24.17 being a difference in favour of Canada of 75 cents. But the great injustice is in the character of the debt, and the assets, or property which accompanies the debt. The Nova Scotia debt is wholly created by the building of Railways from Halifax to Windsor, and from Halifax to Pictou, which with all our public buildings and public property of every description, becomes the property of Canada, the income going into the general revenue, and disposed of by the people "who hold the purse strings."

Year by year this income is steadily increasing, and we shall soon see our Railways paying their own interest and be in reality no debt. But how different is it with Canada. Her debt which she takes into the partnership is not accompanied by property which can ever yield to the Treasury any proportionate return to ours.

I have only been able to obtain the full financial returns of the receipts and payments for mere ordinary services in Canada down to the close of the financial year of 1865, and I find, going back nine years, that in all that time, Canada has not been able for one hour to pay her way; and the accumulated deficiency of those nine years, for mere ordinary services, amounted to \$18,298,073, over two millions a year of debt, besides other debts created for loans to Municipalities, and subsidies to Railways, which also can never yield a return. A Novascotian in his pamphlet says, the Railways of Canada yielded about \$11,000,000 last year, and that the expenses were \$7,000,000, leaving a surplus capable of paying 3 per cent. on the capital; but with that remarkable want of candor and honesty which characterises the whole pamphlet, he does not add the whole truth, and say openly and manfully, as he should, that Canada does not own a mile of Railway, and not one dollar of the earnings of the roads went into the Treasury of Canada. A few years ago we would look with amazement at a member of Parliament sending abroad under his frank such gross misrepresentations; now however we have ceased to feel surprised at the acts of many of our public men.

The simple truth is that twenty millions of the debt of Canada is for money borrowed, and loaned to the Railways,

but
are
cen
186
of h
retu
divi
mud
fifty
is th
that
serv
as if
crea
crea
into
fathe
took
but v
their
and t
have
gant
contr
and a
Cana
some
page
poore
same
Whe
Ta
and y
Agric
gives
the in
sourc
incom
Th
more
impor
being
year
the m
gener

but loaned in such a way that all the private stock holders are to receive full interest before the government receives a cent, and the arrears of interest on the loan to the 30th June 1865 were nearly \$11,000,000, so that there is not a shadow of hope that a cent of the loan or interest for it will ever be returned. The stockholders may have received a small dividend, but the road has suffered for necessary repairs, so much as to be quite unsafe to travel, there having been on it fifty accidents since the commencement of this year. Such is the character of the whole Canadian debt, being for loans that will never be repaid, and for deficiencies in ordinary services caused by enormous salaries to officials. It is just as if two men formed a partnership, the one with heavy debts created by feasting and drinking, and the other with a debt created for a valuable farm, which with all its produce went into the partnership. The prodigal son was forgiven by his father when he repented, but we do not read that his brother took him into partnership and became bound to pay his debts; but we are to be forced into (and kept in if the Delegates and their friends are elected) a partnership with prodigal Canada, and become bound for her debts as well as our own, before we have the least evidence that she has repented of her extravagant course, or shown signs of amendment. A Novascotian contrasts the Customs and Excise Revenues of the Province; and as he finds we pay a few cents more per head than the Canadians, he therefore asserts that taxation is on the whole somewhat lower than in Nova Scotia, except (as he says on page 15) on the supposition that the people of Canada are poorer and do not consume excisable articles to nearly the same extent, a position, he adds, which can scarcely be granted. Whether he grants it or not, the fact is indisputable.

Take up the last Census returns of Nova Scotia and Canada, and you find the returns from the main branches of industry, Agriculture, Mines, Sea, Forest, and the Shipping, in 1863, gives an income of \$11.76 to each inhabitant of Canada, while the income of each inhabitant of Nova Scotia from the same sources averages \$22.07 a head, being nearly double the income of a Canadian.

This with the earnings of our ships, enables us to purchase more goods for consumption, and the consequence is, our imports of dutiable goods are nearly double those of Canada, being in 1865 \$26.16 per head, while it was 'in the same year in Canada only \$10.09. Therefore it is undeniable, that the moment we are all under one tariff, we shall pay into the general revenue nearly double as much as the Canadians,

"who are to hold the purse strings." The Attorney General, a few weeks ago ventured in the House of Assembly to repeat the assertion which Novascotian makes, that our tariff is higher than the Canadian, when Mr. McLellan promptly rose and showed from the actual returns of the quantities consumed in Nova Scotia last year, of four articles, viz: Tea, Sugar, Molasses, and Breadstuffs, that our taxation on these articles alone, would, under the Canadian duties, be increased \$310,000 a year; and when we add to this the increase on nearly all other goods, we shall find ourselves year by year impoverished by heavy duties on all the necessaries of life, for the benefit of Canadians. For example, the duty in Nova Scotia on a pound of tea is six cents, whilst the Canadian tariff charges thirteen cents; we pay ten cents on tobacco—the Canadians pay fifteen; we tax sugar a dollar and a half per hundred pounds—the Canadians tax it two and a half dollars; Nova Scotians pay five cents a gallon on molasses—the Canadians pay twelve cents; we charge an advalorem duty of ten per cent on cloths, cottons, hardware, stationery, manufactures of leather, &c.—Canada taxes the same class of articles fifteen per cent; with us the duty on a bundle of Cotton Warp is thirteen and one quarter cents—under a Canadian tariff we should have to pay 40 cents.

The difficulty in the Government of Canada, has long been, that one section of the country consumed few dutiable goods, and paid comparatively nothing into the revenue, and yet held power over the distribution. The position with us will be still more aggravated; we will pay largely, but be without the power to dispose of a dollar of the revenue.

A few years ago one of the Canadian delegates, Hon. George Brown, in his paper the "Globe" speaking of severing the union of Lower and Upper Canada, said, "The demand for a dissolution of the Union, then, originated not in wantonness, but necessity. *The people were really in advance of the politicians upon the subject.* And when the latter, yielding to circumstances beyond their control, claimed for Upper Canada emancipation from an unnatural, impolitic, and unendurable alliance, a chord in the popular heart was struck which sent forth no uncertain sound. 'By any lawful means,' the people say, 'let this thing called a Union be severed; we will bow down to Lower Canada no more; we will impoverish ourselves no more for its benefit.' Of the issue there can be no doubt." And just so in our case will the voice from the popular heart be, "We will not bow down to Canada, We will not impoverish ourselves for her benefit,

By any lawful means let this thing called a Union be severed."

"Novascotian," unfortunately for himself, refers to the Post Office, and claims it as a source of income, there being but few Post and Way Offices compared to Nova Scotia; the returns as given in their Journals Sessional Paper, Vol. 26, No. 1 of 1866, positively show that including expenses of carriage of mails by Railway, there is an actual deficiency in the year 1865, of $\frac{\text{Pay } \$51,570.62}{\text{Rev. } \$81,000.75} = \$17,773.96$, notwithstanding they taxed newspapers \$90,000, see Sessional Papers Vol. 26, No. 1 of 1866, while we in the same year carried over six millions of newspapers free. In Canada they have but one office to 1,141 of population. We had in the same year one to each 556 of population; we had one to each 31 square miles of territory, they had only one to each 150 miles. But it is useless for Novascotian or any one else to argue that the Canadian tariff is less than ours in the face of the Stamp Duty. There is no people on earth that would submit to the petty and perpetual annoyance of being compelled to pay a tax on every note of hand, bill, receipt, and legal document used, if they had a low rate of taxation otherwise.

THE BENEFITS TO BE REALIZED.

Seeing, then, that the Union imposes upon us such heavy burthens, it may very naturally be supposed that there are benefits, political and commercial, to compensate; but we defy the advocates of Union to name them, to do more than appeal to the imagination, or indulge in vague improbabilities. The losses we shall incur in the surrender to the Canadians of all our revenues, and the power, as the Union Bill expressly says, to tax us by any mode or system they choose, are plain and manifest; and just as plain and clearly defined, should be the benefits to over balance those losses. The intercolonial railway has been held up as the great compensation, but a Nova Scotian with a little unintentional honesty, informs us that Canada, to expand and develop *her resources* still further, and to secure herself from hostility, seeks to build the road, and make common cause with us.

There are very few who will consider it a sufficient boon to us, to have the resources of Canada further developed by giving the Canadians the power to tax us, therefor. We have for years been willing to build a fair proportion of the intercolonial; in fact, Tupper repeatedly declared that our offer was more than just; yet it was trifling, compared to the

sum we shall pay under confederation. In 1862 delegates from Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Canada, met in London, and obtained from the British Government, a guarantee for the money then considered necessary to build the road at $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent, and a sinking fund to commence ten years after the road was built,—Nova Scotia to bear $3\frac{1}{2}$ twelvths of the sum. This arrangement, Canada afterwards refused to carry out; and now, when the rate is 4 per cent, and the sinking fund to commence at once, we have no surety but that she will again violate her engagement.

But let us turn our attention to the benefits we may be supposed to reap from the intercolonial if ever built. We are told in the pamphlet, that we shall have across New Brunswick, and into Canada, connection with the United States railways. Whatever commercial advantages we are to receive from the extension of the Main Trunk railway, will result from the connection with the U. S. railways; but surely this is a round about way. We have only to build a few miles beyond Amherst, to have that connection. Companies are now at work, connecting Bangor with St. John, and building from Moncton to the N. S. Border; and, but for Confederation we should now be busy at work building the section from Truro to the border on some of the routes surveyed. But suppose the intercolonial is even commenced under confederation, Canada only desires connection with the Atlantic, and being the ruling power, will first build down from River du Loup, to St. John's.

Fleming in his report of the survey made in 1864, places this in the clearest possible light. On page 52 of his report in sessional papers, Vol. 25 he says,

"A distinction must necessarily be drawn between through freight, and through passenger traffic." The Ports of Montreal, and Quebec, when open to sea going vessels, are undoubtedly the most convenient for the shipment of heavy freight from Canada to Europe, but these are periodically closed during the winter season. By the projected lines for the intercolonial railway, St. Andrews, and St. John's, on the Bay of Fundy, are the nearest open winter Ports to Canada, within British Territory, and they would therefore, be the most available outlets for Canadian produce, while other nearer ports remain closed. At the present time, Canadian produce may be shipped during winter, without restrictions at United States Ports. The nearest United States port to Toronto, is New York; the nearest to Montreal is Portland; and the shortest

Yo
cor
the
res
sat
by
inst
win
this
adv
Rai
of C
whe
seab
sam
Flen
Inter
Mon
them
duce
Fr
requ
evid
to Fl
secti
the s
65 he

"Tr

distances between the several ports referred to are as follows.

" From Toronto to New York direct.....	540, miles,
" " St. Andrews by river du Loup	889 "
" " St. Johns, by River du Loup	913 "
From Montreal to Portland direct.....	297 "
" to St. Andrews by River du Loup	559 "
" " St. John by River du Loup	583 "
(To Halifax would be 266 miles further.)	

It is evident, therefore, from the favorable position of New York and Portland, that they will continue to be the most convenient winter outlets for Canadian freight, so long as the Government of the United States, abstains from placing restrictions on Canadian commerce. Of this we may rest satisfied, if the construction of the Intercolonial Railway, by opening out an independant outlet to the ocean, prove instrumental in keeping down the barriers to Canadian trade which our neighbors have the power to erect, it might in this respect alone, be considered of the highest commercial advantage to Canada. And in this view, the contemplated Railway may fairly be considered, especially by the people of Canada, West of Montreal, of the greatest value to them when least employed in the transportation of produce to the seaboard." Mark well the last sentence, remembering at the same time that it is the deliberate recorded opinion of Mr. Fleming, the Engineer of the Canadian party, that the Inter-colonial Railway to "the people of Canada, west of Montreal, may be fairly considered of the greatest value to them WHEN LEAST EMPLOYED with transportation of produce to the seaboard."

From this it is evident that the very most the Canadians require, is a road to St. Johns; and now we have the very best evidence, that this is all they purpose building. Turning to Fleming's report, we find he made his survey in two sections; the first embracing from Truro to Moncton, and the second from River du Loup to St. Johns, and on page 65 he gives his estimate of the cost—as follows.

"Truro to Moncton, Nova Scotia division of the survey.

Uniform mileage charges, estimated 109 miles

07,000

Bridgine and grading, \$ 2,693,000

\$ 5,200,000

River du Loup to Apohaqui, New Brunswick, and Canada division of the survey.

Uniform mileage charges	840 miles,	
at \$ 23,000 per mile,		\$ 7,820,000
Bridging and grading		\$ 7,615,500
		\$ 15,435,500

Grand Total, \$20,635,500.

Here the cost of construction from Canada down to the Apohaqui station, is given at \$15,435,500, but on page 49 we find that to St. Johns direct is 17 miles less, which would leave the cost from River du Loup, to St. Johns direct, as near as possible fifteen million dollars. Now the sum which the delegates have inserted in the guarantee bill, is three million pounds sterling, (fifteen million dollars) just the sum necessary for that section of the work, leaving the Nova Scotia section, which will cost as above, \$5,200,000, entirely unprovided for. Taking the fact that a Railway from River du Loup to St. Johns, serves all the purposes of the Canadians, in connection with the sum in the guarantee bill, just covering the estimated cost of that section, we are forced to the conclusion, that the Canadians only intend to build to St. Johns. With six delegates in England eight months, at an enormous cost; it is really surprising that our interests were not better cared for, that provision was not made for building the Nova Scotian section. A single line in the Imperial Union Act, and in the guarantee bill, declaring that the work should be commenced simultaneously on both sections of the road, would have secured our interests. That it was not so inserted, proves either that our delegates neglected their duty, or that they were entirely at the mercy of the Canadians. But then the simple passing of the guarantee bill does not ensure the building of either section of the road.

Mr Adderley, in introducing the bill into the House of Commons, uses these words. "*The guarantee cannot be given until the Canadian Parliament has passed a bill for the construction of the line, and containing clauses for the use of the line, by Her Majesty's troops, and for the re-payment of this money.*" So that although the Imperial Parliament has passed the bill, it is not to come into operation until the Canadian Parliament agrees to construct the road, and fulfil the terms of payment, by a "sinking fund," and we have absolutely no security that the Canadians, now having as they think, got possession of the Lower Provinces,

will not do just as they did in 1862, when having entered by their delegates into a solemn agreement with the delegates from the lower provinces, in conjunction with the Duke of Newcastle, to build the road on his guarantee of the money, afterwards repudiated their obligations in their Parliament, on the ground that the sinking fund which was to commence in ten years, was too heavy an obligation. Whereas the payment of the sinking fund, \$150,000 a year, besides interest provided in this bill, commence immediately on the completion of the road. No doubt during the elections a host of stripling surveyors will be spread all over Cumberland and parts of Colchester, to inspire the belief that the work is to be undertaken forthwith; but depend upon it, if ever built, the Canadians will take their own time for the Nova Scotia section. But suppose this section is in the course of time built, will any one undertake to say that the benefits promised will ever be realized. The resources of Canada, we are told, are principally those of the field and forest. Now suppose lumber from the forest, or grain from the field, is brought down over the Intercolonial, as far as St. Johns, or say the Apohaqui station, 37 miles from St. Johns, will it be shipped at St. Johns which is always an open port, or be carried 250 by railroad to Halifax.

Would any man having a cargo of lumber or flour at St. Johns, on the present railroad, within 37 miles of it, think for a moment of sending it for shipment by railroad to Halifax? Not unless he was a madman. When it is built, in time we shall probably have a portion of the passenger traffic to and from Europe, but passengers come and pass off in the Cunard steamers, without furnishing much employment, or benefiting any one except the hotel keeper who gives them a meal in passing. Articles for the supply of the Halifax market, of more value compared to their bulk than lumber or flour, such as butter and pork, will no doubt be brought over the road, but not for shipment. St. John will be benefited if lumber and flour are brought over the road for shipment, as they are bulky articles that give employment to the labourer, and the shipbuilder, in providing means for transportation. That city is already much larger and more vigorous in growth than Halifax, and will not only receive the freight traffic of the intercolonial, built will, if the connection is made with Nova Scotia, attract to it the general trade and traffic of all the country lying north of the Cobequid Mountains, as well as the coast of the Bay of Fundy. The Cobequid range forms the ridge of natural

water sheds, so to speak; and the traffic on the one side will gravitate to St. John, and on the other to Halifax, just as naturally as the rain which falls on a house roof, descends on either side of the ridge.

A Nova Scotian claims that "Interprovincial tariffs being removed, the markets of the larger province, will be thrown open to the enterprise of the smaller." We have had for many years, free trade with Canada; and the result is, that of all the articles we have for export, Canada does not afford a market for either our coal, plaster, potatoes, fish, or any thing we have to spare. A proposition was made a few years ago, to have free trade in manufactures, and the Canadians urged it; but on enquiry it was found that we could not compete with them, and that the result would be only to kill our infant manufactures, and consequently the proposal was declined. Furniture and wooden ware, is a branch in which we have some growing factories; but there are few places in the world, where furniture is so cheaply produced as Canada; considerable quantities of it, are even exported, thence to England. The same may be said of boots and shoes, and the coarser kinds of cloths, that the effect will be to retard, if not destroy our young factories in those articles.

Passing on to the consideration of the next proposition in the pamphlet,

"WHAT UNION WILL DO FOR THE FARMERS OF NOVA SCOTIA."

We find so many gross absurdities, that it seems almost a waste of time to reply to them. Agricultural produce, beef pork, butter, grain &c. has always been lower in Canada than in Nova Scotia, and whenever you by railroad or steamers, facilitate the getting of these articles brought down at low rates, you reduce their price in the markets of Nova Scotia. We have some little experience in this during the past year. The Government, assisted by Mr. Archibald, imposed a duty on American flour, so as to encourage intercourse with Canada. The result has been the establishment of a line of steamers between Portland and Halifax, which, in addition to flour, brought during the winter, hundreds of packages of butter, and carcasses of fresh pork. The result has been that every farmer in Nova Scotia, who has brought a tub of butter or a carcass of pork to market, has received considerable less for it than if these confedera-

tionists had not been able to put their policy in practice.

It might possibly be claimed, that as the Canadian tariff taxes every barrel of meal, as well as every barrel of flour imported, a half a dollar, that it would be a protection to the farmer; but it is not so. The climate of Nova Scotia seems unfavorable to the growth of wheat and corn, and it is found that the farmer can more profitably employ his labor, in raising other products, and buying much of his flour and meal. Consequently when confederation compels him to pay a half a dollar tax on every barrel of flour, and every barrel of meal he buys, and at the same time gives him a less price for his pork, butter, and homespun, he will be apt to think that the doings of Union are not at all profitable to him. One of the main inducements for the British Government to assent to this "unnatural" Union, was the belief that the new dominion will provide for its own protection, and enable them to withdraw their troops. Mr. Gladstone, the leader of the late government, in the House of Commons, in his place, in supporting the bill to guarantee the money required for part of the intercolonial, said a few weeks ago,—“It was the overshadowing power, and design, and determination of this country, which formed our colonial system, *by placing on us the responsibility of its defence. We have to bring about a different state of things—and it cannot be too distinctly stated, that it is in this view that we look upon the plan for uniting the provinces of British North America.* The evil which attended the old system, casting the burden of the responsibility of colonial defence, wholly, or almost wholly on this country, is not to be measured by the amount of pecuniary drain on our resources. Even if we were so to look at it, it is a very serious thing. *If we were to reckon and apportion, the charge of our military estimates, occasioned by keeping a British force in these provinces; it would startle many Hon. Members. It is a very heavy charge indeed, and it is our duty in every way to get rid of it.*”

Does any intelligent farmer require plainer proof, that the delegates have arranged a scheme, and made promises of defence, which the Statesmen of England accept as a justification in withdrawing their troops. It is a very significant fact, that, immediately on the passage of the Confederation Bill, the British Government telegraphed an order to stop work on the forts at George's Island; and the day is not far distant, when under Confederation, we shall have seen the last of the red coats in Nova Scotia. Now the raising of

beef and mutton, for the supply of the troops in Halifax, has been the main-stay of the farmer; and when this is taken away, it will not matter to him, ~~how great the necessities are,~~ for getting flour from Canada; for he will be without the means to purchase it. If Canada required any of our agricultural products, and if Confederation would open to us a market there, then the writer of the pamphlet might with propriety say, that the interest of the farmer lies in Confederation; but when it is as plain and clear as a sunbeam, that just the reverse is the case, he only insults the intelligence of the farmers, who see clearly what Confederation will do for them. It will lower the price of every article of produce they have to sell, and will compel them to pay

More duty on their tea,
 More duty on their sugar,
 More duty on their molasses,
 More duty on their flour,
 More duty on their meal,
 More duty on their yarn,
 More duty on their dry goods,
 More duty on everything they purchase.

It will transfer to a Parliament sitting at Ottawa, in which they will have but 19 Representatives, out of 181, the right to "tax them by any mode or system" (see 91st. clause of Union Bill,) and for any purpose. It will compel them to pay for Canadian Canals, and Canadian defences and fortifications—for the opening up of the Northwest Territory, the purchase of the Hudson Bay Territory, and all other schemes for the extension and aggrandizement of Canada. Compel them to pay a stamp duty on all deeds, leases, notes, receipts &c. and a postage tax on every newspaper they receive. And not lastly nor least, it will make the Nova Scotian farmer, "dread the approach to manhood" of his son's, "as the period," which under Confederation, gives the Canadians the power to order them away for Militia duty, on any part of the 1,500 miles of exposed frontier of Canada: no matter how unprotected the parental roof may be left. The same may be enumerated, as among

"ITS ADVANTAGES TO THE FISHERMEN,"

Who will be liable to be called away at any time the Canadians please, to do naval duty on the lakes. We have before us a speech, by one of the Canadian delegates, in which he says, that supposing an invasion of their soil, and it was needful to arm a flotilla on the lakes, it would be of great advantage, to have the 30,000 sailors of the Atlantic

Provinces to call upon for such service. But what commercial advantages will it give to the fisherman? For many years, there has been free trade in fish with Canada, but they send us more than they buy; and how Confederation is to change this, and give us a home market, is something the Pamphlet does not explain; and surely the author does not seriously mean to say, that Canada has more influence in opening markets to our fish than Britain has; and as to the protection of them, the papers submitted to the House of Assembly, by Dr. Tupper, show conclusively that the Canadians suggested and carried the plan of licensing American fishermen for a trifling sum, to participate in our fisheries, whilst their own Government taxed enormously the fish caught by the Nova Scotians. No, Confederation will not increase the number of fish, nor give a home or foreign market, nor yet protect the fisherman in his rights.

"THE ARTIZAN AND LABORER"

Having shown that Confederation will tend to impoverish our farmers and fishermen, it follows that it must prove injurious to the mechanic and laborer, whose interests are entirely dependent on the prosperity of the former. Our revenues being now handed over to the Canadians, who have so many undertakings of their own to accomplish, we cannot hope for any aid in further carrying on public works, or for aiding in the development of our resources. In the past few years, the mechanic or laborer, has had in Nova Scotia, but little cause for complaint; he has found ready employment at fair wages; and had we retained control of our revenues, which every year were increasing, we should have been able to aid such public undertakings as would have given employment to all; but so short of funds shall we be under Canadian rule, that the most ardent Confederate, acquainted with the terms, acknowledges that we shall not have more than half the sum for roads and bridges, that we are now able to grant. To assert that Confederation will give employment to Nova Scotians, in manufactures, is simply preposterous, so long as labor is so much lower in Canada, than here; and this in connection with her marvellous water power, has enabled her already to far outstrip us in manufactures. *Labor is cheaper in Lower Canada, than in any other part of North America.*

"THE OPPONENTS OF UNION"

Under this heading, our Pamphleteer acknowledges, that "many men of large means, and high intelligence, look upon

the approach of Confederation with undisguised apprehension," but asserts, that it is because they dread being brought into competition with Capital. Does he not know that Capital is more abundant in Nova Scotia, than in any other of the Provinces of the Confederacy? How then can bankers, capitalists, and merchants, dread Confederation on this ground? The inducements for men of means who have money to put out, are very strong in favor of the scheme. At present, no man in Nova Scotia is permitted, under heavy penalty, to charge more than six per cent. interest, for money loaned, or debts due; but in Canada there is no such restriction, and the consequence is, when a man once gets in debt, his nose is ever after kept to the grindstone, by having to pay from seven to ten per cent interest on his liabilities.

So far from our men of means, our merchants, having to be content with a smaller per centage, the very reverse will be the case: for under Confederation every banker will be permitted to charge a heavier discount, and every merchant who has hundreds of farmers and mechanics indebted to him, will be permitted to charge them a heavier interest than heretofore. That so many of them have been able to withstand this temptation to go for Confederation, is to be attributed to their "high intelligence," and shrewd business capacity, which makes it clear to them, that 6 per cent is better from customers willing and able to pay a larger rate than customers impoverished by heavy taxation, and restrictions which Confederation imposes. Their motto is, "small per centage with sure returns."

"THE DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE"

Every Nova Scotian, feels a deep interest in this part of the subject, and it should not be treated in "probabilities." The actual returns should be taken, that all may know to a certainty, how the peoples money will, under Confederation, be disposed of. Taking the financial returns of 1866, I find the following sums would have been paid in to the Canadian Government, by us under our tariff.

Customs and Excise,.....	\$1,281,902
Light Duty,.....	37,687
Marriage License,.....	4,950
Post Office Revenues,.....	69,019
Railway Revenue,.....	199,739
Board of Revenue,.....	2,400
Sable Island,.....	14,275
Penitentiary,.....	1,595
Fisheries,.....	1,161

\$1,562,709

Out of this they would have paid,		
Salary of Lieut. Governor,	\$15,000	
Judges,	17,650	
Pensions,	4,800	
Governor's Secretary,	1,250	
Statistics,	2,488	
Prosecutions,	2,814	
Interest on \$8,000,000 debt,		}
part of which is in Province		
Notes without interest, and part		
in Savings Bank, at 4 per cent.		
Counting balance at 6 per cent make	\$430,348	
Revenue Expenses,	74,874	
Drawbacks,	15,952	
Railway Expenses,	165,572	
Sable Island,	10,789	
Light Houses, (2 built)	58,535	
Penitentiary,	15,618	
Steamers and Packets,	10,400	
Miscellaneous,	5,000	
Militia,	104,500	
Post Office Expenses,	86,127	
Judiciary Expenses,	1,575	\$1,023,292
Leaving,	\$539,417	
Out of this the Federal Government, would have		
paid the Local Government, the 80 cents }		\$324,000
a head allowance, and the \$60,000 }		
Retaining,	\$215,417	

From these sources of revenue, it is seen that the Canadian Government, would have retained, two hundred, and fifteen thousand dollars, but if we had been under their tariff, of course our payments would have been very much larger, and the amount they would have left in hand of our money would be at least, three quarters of a million dollars. Year by year as our country grows, and our revenues increase, the amount paid into the Canadian Treasury will become greater, but our revenues will never exceed the 80 cents a head, up to 400,000 souls and the \$60,000, although the local wants of the country must increase, with its population. Even at the present time the local revenue is entirely inadequate to provide for the local services in the same liberal manner as we have hitherto done.

Take the Revenue from mines, in 1866,	net.....\$59,764
Crown Lands,	net.....26,526
Allowance from General Government,	324,000

Total Local Revenue.....\$410,290

And from this deduct local expenditure, as made in 1866, viz.

Hospital for Insane,.....	\$37,277	
Province Building,.....	8,001	
Government House,.....	9,765	
Poor Asylum,.....	12,000	
Transient Poor,.....	5,736	
Ferries,.....	5,000	
Navigation Securities, say,.....	35,000	
St. Peters Canal,.....	31,841	
Proportion of Legislative Expenses,.....	30,000	
" " Departments,.....	15,000	
" " Printing,.....	6,000	
Coroners Inquests,.....	1,400	
Agriculture,.....	14,000	
Miscellaneous Services,.....	19,000	
Immigration,.....	20,000	\$250,020

Leaving for roads, bridges, & education, only \$160,270 to which was paid in 1866—Roads,....	\$274,428	
Education,.....	133,595	\$408,023

Making deficiency of\$247,753

It may be said, and perhaps justly, that the expenditures on some of the local services were unnecessary, but still the money was there for local purposes, and if not all required for those services, should have been appropriated to education, or roads and bridges. In the above statement there is no charge for interest, on any excess of debt there may be over the eight millions; and as it is pretty well understood, that there will be at least half a million chargeable against the local legislature, or \$25,000 for interest annually, this will make the deficiency \$272,753. Now supposing there is a reduction made in the ordinary local services, say \$50,000, there will still be \$222,753 to be deducted from the grants to education, and roads and bridges, or to be provided by direct taxation.

ITS POLITICAL ASPECT.

Until this scheme of Confederation was consummated, Nova Scotia was a free, self-governing community, in direct communication with the Imperial Authorities. The humblest Official, dismissed without cause, the poorest man in the province, who had received injustice at the hands of the Local Government, had the right of appeal to the Queen. Under Confederation, your relations with the Mother Country, will be entirely changed. You will have no longer the privilege of approaching our gracious Sovereign, for a redress of grievances, but must carry your complaints to the Governor General, at Ottawa. You cease to be a self-governing Colony of England, you are made Canadians by Act of Parliament,

and must submit to the rule of a Legislative Assembly, in which you are represented by 19 in a House of 181 Members, and of a Government in which you may perhaps have no representatives at all.

THE NECESSITIES FOR UNION.

Although the abstract question for Colonial Union had, from time to time, been discussed in the Legislature and from the platform, no attempt was made to give it form and shape until the meeting of Delegates came off in Quebec, in the autumn of 1864. The question had previously been treated by our public men rather for the purpose of oratorical display, and fine writing in the papers, than as a measure of practical utility. It is true that a resolution was adopted in the House of Assembly in 1861, but its terms were so vague and undefined that it committed no one to any particular form of union, or to anything but a declaration in favor of discussion; that the question might be "set at rest." It was brought up at a convention of Delegates from the three Provinces, at Quebec, in 1862, when it was unanimously decided that even its discussion was "premature," and the question, as every one then thought, was set at rest. And so it would have been but for the necessities of Canada. After a succession of dead locks and changes of administration, which threatened to make Parliamentary Government impossible in that country, the scheme of confederating with the Maritime Provinces was suggested as the readiest mode of relieving Canada from a state of political and financial embarrassment. We all know what followed:—The meeting of Delegates at Prince Edward Island—the convention at Quebec—the betrayal of our rights by our own Legislature, culminating in the delegation to England and the passage of the Imperial Act. That this scheme was forced upon us by the necessities of Canada we have the most ample proof. Hon. Mr. Galt, one of the ablest men in that Province, frankly admitted the fact in his speech in Parliament on the Confederation Bill. "Let the House frankly and kindly look at it as a great measure brought down for the purpose of relieving Canada from *distress and depression*—at this moment Canada standing alone had seen her *credit seriously impaired*, but Confederation would give us a *much larger fund to pledge, for the security of the public creditor!* the lower Provinces are in a much better position, and if the local revenues become inadequate, the local Governments would have to resort to *direct taxation*." The people of Nova Scotia never dreamed of any change in their Institutions, which would have deprived them of the priceless blessings of self-government, and the most perfect control over their own affairs. Why should they? We never had any war of races as in Canada—any rebellions, any dead locks, any annexation

parties. Loyal, peaceful, and contented, we were steadily enlarging our Commerce, improving and beautifying the Country, rapidly extending our roads and railways, under the lightest tariff in America. But although naturally unwilling to surrender the *political* control of our affairs to the Canadians, or to any other people, we were not averse to closer and more intimate fiscal and *commercial* arrangements with our fellow Colonists. To the free exchange of the products of the forest, the field, the mine, and the sea, we had no objection (except the fear that our infant industries might suffer) to add free trade in the manufactures of the several Provinces—to an assimilation of our Currencies—to uniform book, parcel, and letter postage—to closer connection by railway, to any, and every thing that would promote the trade and interests of all. And here let us enquire if it was imperative, that we must confederate, that we should surrender our prosperous revenues, and submit to increased taxation, for any or all of these measures, even if they were far more valuable than they really are. Would England, for the sake of free trade with France, or a railway connecting the two Countries together, were that possible, be content to merge her identity and independence, and become an outlying dependency of her Gallic neighbour? No one imagines anything so absurd, and yet we Nova Scotians are asked to do something very like it.

THE INTERCOLONIAL RAILROAD.

Better far that we should construct the Intercolonial Railway ourselves; for the money we must pay into the Canadian Treasury, the first year we are Confederated, would be fully equal to the interest on the entire cost of the road. Much as we desire the Railway, we can live without it. Our Country is surrounded by the sea, our harbours are open all the year round, and our Merchants and Mariners have access to every part of the globe at all seasons. The case is very different with Canada. With her ports closed by ice for five months in the year, she is cut off during that time from all communication with the outer world, except through a foreign territory. "The railway, then, which would enable the Canadian to escape from this state of thralldom, is a measure of prime necessity; indispensable to his security, his dignity, and independence." Prominent Members of the Canadian Parliament have frankly admitted that, whether Confederated or not, Canada must have the Intercolonial Railway.

Mr. Rose, a supporter of the Government, who sits for Montréal, said:—

"We were now almost commercially dependent on the United States, and were dependent for access to the ocean on them. The railway would cost a good deal of money, but it was one of the unfortunate incidents of our position, and a necessity for us."

Colonel Hareltain, also a prominent supporter of the Ministry, spoke out even more plainly:—

"We must have the railroad, and pay for it *whether we have political union or not.* It was needed for commercial, social, and defensive purposes."

With these opinions animating the debates in the Canadian Parliament, and the columns of the Canadian press, it is sheer folly to talk of the railway being contingent on the Confederation of the Provinces. Canada cannot afford to be longer dependent on a foreign power, which may, at any moment, shut out her products from the markets of the world for five months in every year. She must have access to the sea through British Territory, and a winter port at either Halifax or St. John. Colonel Haultain, speaking the public sentiment of Canada, truly said, "We must have the railroad, and pay for it whether we have political union or not."

FREE TRADE.

If, by a little tact and firmness, we might have secured the Intercolonial Railroad without Confederation, the way to free trade was even more easy. Over and over again the Canadian government pressed Nova Scotia and New Brunswick to establish intercolonial trade between the Provinces, and at the very time when they themselves declared that even the discussion of the question of Colonial Union was premature. Upon this point the evidence is clear and conclusive, as will appear from the report made by Mr. Annand, then Financial Secretary, to his government, which will be found in the appendix of the Journals of 1863, No. 62. Referring to the discussion of the subject by the Finance Ministers of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, Mr. Annand remarks:—

"The prevailing sentiment at both of these meetings was in the highest degree favorable to the adoption of a free trade policy between the British North American Provinces. The representatives of the government of Canada, probably feeling that many of the manufactures of that Province, fostered by a tariff more or less protective in its character, would compete most successfully with those of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, were desirous of giving immediate effect to the policy under consideration. The Finance Ministers of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, on the other hand, while admitting the soundness of the general principle, were not prepared on the instant to adopt so extensive a change in our revenue laws."

Here, then, we find Canada urging the "immediate" adoption of free trade in manufactures, and New Brunswick and Nova Scotia pleading for delay, for the following among other reasons which are fully set out in the report:

Because it would be unjust to existing interests, without

timely notice, to bring the limited and infant productions of the Maritime Provinces into competition with the larger and more advanced manufactures of Canada. And because the change would involve a loss of revenue, which neither of them could afford.

But if there was any doubt on the subject, it would be completely set at rest by the following Minute of Council, signed by the Premiers of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick:

"I. That the free interchange of goods, the growth, produce, and manufacture of the Provinces, and uniformity of tariff, are considered to be an indispensable consequence of the construction of the Intercolonial Railway.

"II. But that in consequence of the recent diminution of the revenues of the respective Provinces, arising out of the war in the neighboring republic, and the increased liabilities incurred by the additional obligations necessary to the construction of the proposed road, the Delegates from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia regret that they are not at this moment in a position to adopt measures to carry this important principle into practical effect.

J. S. MACDONALD,

for Canada.

JOSEPH HOWE,

S. I. TILLEY."

Canada was pressing for "the free interchange of goods, the growth, produce and manufacture of the Provinces." The Delegates from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, while admitting the soundness of the general principle of free trade, "regret" that they were not then in a position to adopt the measure—the Intercolonial Railway must be built first.

Having thus conclusively demonstrated that Nova Scotia might have secured both the railway and free trade without Confederation, it is not necessary to dwell upon the minor questions of postage, currency, &c., which could have been easily arranged with our fellow Colonists if thought worth the trouble.

CONCLUSION.

I have endeavored to show in the course of this argument, and I trust not without a large measure of success, that there was nothing in the political, financial or social condition of Nova Scotia to warrant a fundamental change in her institutions, or the formation of any but commercial and industrial connections with the distant colony of Canada. Prosperous, contented and happy—controlling her own Government, and rapidly developing the resources of the country, the people of this Province had everything to lose and nothing to gain by the transfer of her Government, revenues and resources to an authority 800 miles off.

That "the case of Belgium" instead of furnishing an argument in favor of Confederation, is perhaps the best illustration that can be given in favor of our retaining unimpaired the priceless blessings of self-government, which we now enjoy. Belgium confederated with a neighboring nation, and it was only after an experience of fifteen years, that she broke away and declared her independence, since which time she has become, although a small, "isolated" Country, one of the most prosperous of all the European Kingdoms.

That the terms of the proposed Union are manifestly unjust, to the people of Nova Scotia. A large portion of the debt of Canada has arisen from expenditures which yield no return, and from financial deficits running over a long period of years: while the debt of Nova Scotia is represented by productive works, which now pay a small per centage upon their cost, and in a short time may be reasonably expected to pay the interest on the price of construction.

That by the surrender of our chief revenues to the Dominion of Canada, the appropriations for the local wants of the Country must be reduced about a quarter of a million of dollars per annum—a larger amount than was granted for the entire road and bridge service, at the last session of the Legislature.

That under the Canadian Tariff, you would, if Confederated, have paid on articles you consumed last year, at least \$500,000 over and above the taxes you really did pay, every cent of which would have gone into the Canadian Treasury, along with a quarter of a million of dollars taken away from your local improvements.

That, by a little tact and management, you might have secured both Free Trade and the Intercolonial Railway, both of which are more necessary to, and more desired by, the Canadians, than by the people of Nova Scotia.

But it may be said—"Confederation is now a fixed fact," that a Bill for uniting the Provinces has received the assent of the Imperial Government, and that, whether for good or evil, we must patiently submit. And so we would if the measure had ever been approved by the people. Carried as it was through the Imperial Parliament by misrepresentations most foul—forced as it is upon us without our consent, it may be our true policy, if not our duty, even now to give the Confederation scheme a fair trial—to examine and inquire if there is any good in it—and to so amend and improve the measure, if that be possible, so as to make it acceptable to the people of this country. But before all, and above all, the first duty of the Electors of Nova Scotia is to choose, both for the Dominion Parliament and the Local Legislature, tried and trusty men,—men incapable of betraying their dearest rights,—men who, whether absent or present, will never forget their obligations to the people, and the interests of the Province committed to their charge.